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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES R. HENRY, 
Appellant, 
-vs.-
WASHIKI CLUB, INCORPORATED, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
THE FACTS 
Case No. 
9249 
In this brief we refer to the parties as they appeared 
in the court below. 
The Statement of Facts set forth in appellant's brief 
is not complete and omits certain salient facts which were 
relied upon by the court in arriving at its decision in 
defendant's favor. We, therefore, deem it necessary to 
supplement the Statement of Facts in appellant's brief 
with the following: 
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Defendant operates a night club or tavern in the 
basement of the Ogden Hotel in Ogden. (McKinley de-
position, p. 4.) The club consists essentially of a bar, an 
orchestra stand, and a dance floor and table and chairs 
for patrons. The 1nain room is approximately 40 feet by 
90 feet in dimensions. (l\icKinley deposition, p. 5.) Rest 
rooms for both male and female patrons are situated at 
one end, being the same end as that where the bar is 
located. (McKinley deposition, pp. 5-6) The tables and 
chairs provided for the accommodation of patrons are 
generally in the opposite end of the room. (Plaintiff's 
deposition, p·p. 28-30.) Because of a lo'v ceiling over the 
bar, the neon light identifying the men's rest room is not 
visible from most of the area occupied by the tables and 
chairs. (McKinley deposition, pp. 6-9.) 
At the opposite end of the room from the rest rooms 
are two swinging doors. Over the s"inging doors is a 
neon sign which says "Dining Room.'' This sign, how-
ever, was not illuminated on the evening of the accident 
and was not observed by plaintiff. (Plaintiff's deposi-
tion, p. 33.) At that time there "\Yas no other sign of any 
kind on or over the doors. ( I\Icl~inley deposition, p. 7.) 
Through the swinging doors "\Yas an old kitchen roon1, 
which at the time of the accident "\Yas used by defendant 
for storage of beer, ice, and other supplies. (McKinley 
deposition, p. 6.) .A.ccording to plaintiff's testimony 
there was no light "rhatsoever in this roon1. (Plaintiff's 
deposition, p. 63.) However, according to the testilnony 
of Mcl\inley it \Yas lighted by a :25 "\Yatt globe for the 
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convenience of defendant's employees. ( l\IcKinley depo-
sition, pp. 7-8.) In a corner of the storage room, diagon-
ally opposite to the SV\7inging doors, were t\vo doors, one 
leading to a sump pump in the basement. (McKinley 
deposition, p. 9.) 
As indicated in plaintiff's brief, on the evening of 
the accident plaintiff had gone on a party with a group 
of friends during which they had been drinking, eating 
and dancing. Although plaintiff attempted to minimize 
the drinking on his deposition, he admitted, when pressed, 
that he had had at least five and possibly as many as 
seven whiskey high balls during the course of the evening 
prior to the occurrence of the accident. (Plaintiff's depo-
sition, p. · 58.) According to the testimony of Phipps, 
about one-half of the contents of plaintiff's pint of Jim 
Beam had been consumed when he found the bottle the 
next day. (Phipps' deposition, p. 36.) This would indi-
cate that plaintiff drank a half pint of whisky before the 
party returned the Combo, plus whatever he drank there-
after at the 'Combo and the Washiki ·Club. (From three 
to five more drinks.) 
Although plaintiff had been in defendant's place of 
business on only one prior occasion and did not know 
of the location of the n1en's rest room, he did not make 
any inquiry of defendant's employees as to its location, 
but instead, undertook to locate it by his own search. 
(Plaintiff's deposition, p. 33.) Although there was noth-
ing on or over the swinging doors to indicate or suggest 
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that they led to a rest room, plaintiff passed through 
them and into the kitchen or storage room. (Plaintiff'5 
deposition, p. 33.) He testified that it was very dark, 
and there was no light, that he could barely see at all, 
and that he more or less felt or groped his way through 
the room or passageway until he made a turn. (Plain-
tiff's deposition, pp. 33-35.) He then, in some un-
explained fashion, fell down a stairway. Although plain-
tiff had a cigarette lighter ·with him he did not avail 
himself of any light which it might afford. (Plaintiff's 
deposition, p. 34.) 
In plaintiff's argu1nent he states that defendant 
should have been aware of the danger of patrons passing 
into the kitchen or storage room and falling do'vn the 
stairway because there had been previous similar epi-
sodes. However, the record does not so indicate. Al-
though McKinley and defendant's employees, Kixon and 
Lemmon, admitted that on prior occasions a few patrons 
had gone as far as the s'vinging doors, they all testified 
that none had ever passed 1nore than a step or t\YO be-
yond them. Other patrons had pro1nptly and properly 
recognized that the doors did not lead to rest rooms or 
any other facilities \vhich defendant's patrons """ere in-
vited to use. (Nixon deposition, pp. 10, 11, 12; Lem1non 
deposition, p. 5; l\Icl{inley deposition, pp. 8-9, 15.) They, 
therefore, returned in11nediately to the main portion of 
the pren1ises and made inquir~~ of defendant's employees, 
rather than seeking the rest roon1 at a place \Yhere it 
quite obviously could not be l'xpected to be. (Nixon 
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deposition, pp. 10, 11, 12; Lemmon deposition, p. 5; Mc-
Kinley deposition, p. 15.) The only person other than 
plaintiff ever shown to have gone beyond the swinging 
doors was one Carl L. Gillies. However, his experience 
occurred on the same night as plaintiff's. (R. 16, Mc-
Kinley deposition, p. 15.) And he had the prudence to 
light a match, thus discovering the presence of the stair-
way and avoiding it. (R. 16, Nixon deposition, p. 12.) 
McKinley had been 1nanager of the W ashiki Club six 
years when his deposition was taken, (McKinley deposi-
tion, p. 3) and Nixon had been employed there four years, 
(Nixon deposition, p. 2). 
Since there were no signs indicating or suggesting the 
presence of a rest room in or near the place where plain-
tiff's accident occurred, plaintiff was not as to that p·or-
tion of the premises an invitee, and defendant had no 
duty of care toward him. In the absence of any evidence 
that any other patron had, on any previous occasion, 
passed beyond the swinging doors or into any hazards 
which may have lurked in the dimly lighted kitchen, de-
fendant was under no duty to anticipate that a patron 
such as the plaintiff here, would pass so far into the 
room, without benefit of any light, as to fall down a sump 
pump located in the far corner of the room. ~1oreover, 
in undertaking to pass through a darkened room with 
which he was wholly unfamiliar and without undertaking 
to use such means of light as he had available, plaintiff 
was guilty of contributory negligence and voluntary as-
sumption of risk barring any recovery on his part. 
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POINTS TO BE ARGL"ED 
POINT I 
PLAIN'TIFF WAS AT BEST A LICENSEE AT THE 
PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT O·CCURRED AND THERE-
FORE THE DEFENDANT OWED HIM NO DUTY TO MAKE 
THE PREMISES SAFE, AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY 
NEGLIGENCE OR BREACH OF DU'TY TOWARD HIM. 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GEN·CE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK AS A MA'TTER OF 
LAW. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE ULTIMATE FA·CTS, 
AND THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT TO 
BE DETERMINED BY A JURY. THEREFORE THIS IS A 
PROPER CASE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
ARGlT~IENT 
POINT I 
PLAIN'TIFF WAS AT BEST A LICENSEE AT THE 
PLACE WHERE THE ACCIDENT O·CCURRED AND THERE-
FORE THE DEFENDANT OWED HIM NO DUTY TO MAKE 
THE PREMISES SAFE, AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF ANY 
NEGLIGENCE OR BREACH OF DU'TY TOWARD HIM. 
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vV e here answer plaintiff's Points I and III. It is 
conceded that plaintiff entered upon defendant's prem-
ises as an invitee. Jiowever, it is well settled that a busi-
ness invitee as to one portion of a land-owner's premises 
Inay be but a 1nere licensee or even a trespasser as to 
another portion of the premises. It is equally well settled 
that the duty to exercise care for the safety of an invitee 
extends only to that portion of the premises to which the 
invitation extends. The general rule is well stated in 38 
Am. Jur. 761, Negligence, Sec. 100, which reads as fol-
lows: 
"An owner or occupant is liable for an injury 
sustained by a person, vvho entered the premises 
by invitation as a result of a defective condition 
of the premises only where the part of the prem-
ises upon which the injury was sustained was 
covered by the invitation. If a person, although 
on the premises by invitation, goes to a place not 
covered by the invitation, the owner's duty of care 
owed to such a person as ··an invitee ceases forth-
with. Thus, where one enters a part of the prem-
ises reserved for the use of the occupant and his 
employees, and to which there was no express or 
implied invitation to go, there can be no recovery 
for resulting injury, even though he is an invitee 
to other parts of the premises. This does not 
mean that the duty of an owner to have his prem-
ises in such condition that an invitation to visit 
him may be accepted \vithout danger of p·ersonal 
injury from a defective condition is limited neces-
sarily to any specific portion of the premises; but 
it is limited to parts that reasonably appear to 
have been designed, adapted and prepared for the 
accommodation of such a person and to those 
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parts to which the invitee reasonably may be 
expected to go, in vie'v of the invitation given 
him.'' 
See also A.L.I., Restatement of Torts, Sec. 343, Coln-
rnent b: 
"Under the rule stated in this Section, a pos-
sessor of land is subject to liability to another 
as a business visitor only for such bodily harm as 
he sustains while upon a part of the land upon 
which the possessor gives the other reason to be-
lieve that his presence is permitted or desired be-
cause of its connection with the business or affairs 
of the possessor and \v·hich as such is held open 
to the other as a business visitor." 
See also Sec. 341, Comment b. 
In Prosser on Torts, 2d Edition, page ±58, the au-
thor says: 
"The special obligation to,vard invitees exists 
only while the visitor is upon the part of the 
premises "rhich the occupier has thrown open to 
him for the purpose "~hich 1nakes him an invitee. 
This 'area of invitation' "Till of course vary "ith 
the circu1nstances of the case. * * * If the custo-
Iner is invited or encouraged to go to an unusual 
part of the pre1nises, such as behind a counter or 
into a storeroo1n, for the purpose 'vhich has 
brought hin1, he ren1ains an invitee; but 1J he 
goes U'ithout such encouragcJJlcnt and solely on 
hi~s own i11,itiati.ve, he is only a licensee if there is 
consent, or a trespasser if there is not." (Elnpha-
sis ours.) 
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The rule has been recognized by this court and the 
passage above quoted from Am. Jur. 'vas cited with ap-
proval in the case of Hayward vs. Downi·ng, (Utah), 189 
Pac. 2d 442. This court also quoted with approval from 
38 Am. J ur. 794, Negligence, Sec. 133 as follows: 
"The duty of the proprietor of a place of 
business which is open to public patronage to use 
ordinary care to 1nake the p-remises safe for custo-
mers is generally limited to that part of the 
premises designed, adapted and prepared for the 
accommodation of customers, or to which custo-
mers mwy reasonably be expected to go.'' 
See also Thompson vs. Beard and G.abelman, Inc., 
(Kan.), 216 Pac. 2d 798, where the court said at p. 800: 
"The duty of the proprietor of a place of 
business which is open to p·ublic patronage to use 
ordinary care to make the premises reasonably 
safe for customers is generally limvted to that 
part of the premises designed, adapted, and pre-
pared for the accomn~odation of customers, or to 
which customers may reasonably be expected to 
go. The duty of the proprietor of a place of busi-
ness to his customers does not require him to ren-
der safe for their use parts of the building re-
served for use only by him and his employees, 
such as p-rivate offices, shipping rooms, and ware-
rooms, unless he expressly or impliedly invites 
or induces a customer to enter such a reserved 
part. (38 Am. tTur. 794, and cases cited.) A per-
son who has received an injury in consequence of 
passing through ~ 'vrong doorway in a part of the 
building not designed for the use of unattended 
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customers cannot recover unless he vvas induced 
to enter therein by the invitation or allurement 
of the proprietor. (38 Am. Jur. 796 and cases cited 
innote15)." (Sic.) 
See also Trautloff v. Danver M~lls, (1fo. App.), 316 
SW2d 866. 
Plaintiff has cited and relied upon the Kansas cases 
of Campbell v. Weathers, 111 P 2d 72, and Bass vs. Hunt, 
100 P 2d 696. However, both of those cases are readily 
distinguishable from the case at bar. In each case a state 
law required the operator of a restaurant to p·rovide 
toilet facilities for the patrons. In each case the path·w,ay 
provided for the patrons to the toilet was rendered 
hazardous by the presence of an open trap door. In both 
cases the path was dark and the hazard could not be 
readily observed. There was no question in either case 
as to the plaintiff following the proper and only course 
leading to the toilet facilities, whereas in the case at bar, 
there is no evidence of any danger whatsoever in the 
route actually leading to the toilet facilities actually 
provided by defendant. Here the plaintiff \Yas not fol-
lowing a path indicated to him by the proprietor, but on 
the contrary \vas going in an entirely opposite direction 
in the fruitless search for the facilities he sought. At-
tention is also invited to the n1ore recent Kansas case of 
Thompson v. Beard and Gabeln11an, Inc., (l(an.), 216 P. 
2d 798, \Yhere under facts analogous to those here, the 
l{ansas ·Court follo\Yed the theor~~ for \Yhich "~e here 
contend. 
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We have heretofore cited portions of the comment to 
Sec. 343 of the Restatement of Torts. Those portions of 
the comrnent quoted in appellant's brief are wholly in-
applicable here. Comment d pertains to what a business 
visitor is entitled to expect on that portion of the prem-
·ises to which the invitation extends. The portion of com-
ment b quoted by plaintiff pertains to a situation where 
the possessor has '"intentionally or negligently mis-led" 
the visitor into a reasonable belief that a particular 
passageway or door is an appropriate means of reaching 
the area which the visitor is invited to enter. There is 
no evidence in this case that defendant, either intention-
ally or negligently, did anything which would mislead a 
patron into believing that the swinging doors to the store-
room led to the men's rest room. 
The case of lJfartin v. Jones, (Ut.), 253 P 2d 359, 
cited and quoted by plaintiff, is not applicable to the in-
stant case. In that case the plaintiff was admittedly 
trespassing. However, his presence in a position of po-
tential danger was observed by one of defendant's em-
ployees. Although she, (the employee), was aware of the 
danger confronting plaintiff, she did not warn him of it. 
The case was decided under the principle set forth under 
Sec. 337 of the Restatement of Torts dealing with the 
duty of a possessor of land to a trespasser where the 
possessor knows or should know of the trespasser's p·res-
ence ~n dangerous proximity to an artificial dangerous 
condition and where the condition is of such a nature 
that the possessor would have reason to believe that the 
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trespasser would not discover it or realize the risk in-
volved therein. There is no evidence in this case that any 
employee of the defendant was aware that plaintiff had 
passed through the S\vinging doors or that he had at-
tempted or would attempt to pass through the darkness 
of defendant's storeroom to the head of the stairs to the 
sump pump. 
As previously noted in our Statement of Facts, there 
is no evidence that any patron of defendant had passed 
beyond the swinging doors leading to defendant's store-
room prior to the accident here involved. The testimonies 
of McKinley, Nixon and Lemmon were all to the effect 
that whenever they observed anyone go through the 
swinging doors, such persons immediately recognized 
that such did not lead to the rest room and immediately 
turned around and came back. The only other person 
ever shown to have n1ade the same mistake as plaintiff 
is Carl Gillies, -vvhose affidavit appears at Page 16 of 
the record. By the terms of his own affidavit, his nlis-
take occurred on the same night as plaintiff's. In the 
absence of any showing that other patrons had on prior 
occasions passed through the S\vinging doors and through 
the storage roon1 to the area of the stair\Yay leading 
to the sump roon1, there is no basis upon \vhich a jury 
could find that defendant should have kno\Yn of, or anti-
cipated the presence of its patrons in that area. 
rrhe cases ei tL'd and relied upon by plaintiff under 
I)oint III of his brief are so different fro1n the facts of 
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the case at bar as to be readily distinguishable. The case 
of Ilectus v. Chicago Transi~t Company, (Ill. App.), 122 
NE~d 587, arose out of a collision between one of de-
fendant's buses with one of its patrons, who had dis-
Inounted from the bus. After dismounting, the plaintiff 
used a rest room situated inside a loop in defendant's 
track. The accident occurred as plaintiff 'vas crossing 
the track to the outside of the loop after leaving the rest 
room. One of the issues was whether plaintiff was an 
invitee. Because there was substantial evidence that the 
rest room had been used by the defendant's patrons and 
others, the court held that it was jury question whether 
plaintiff was an invitee. 
The case of Palmer v. Boston Penny Savings Bank, 
(Mass.), 17 NE2d 899, involved an erroneous choice of 
two similar doors. In that case plaintiff attempted to 
return to defendant's premises through the same door 
he entered. Upon finding it locked, he made a fairly 
careful attempt to find the correct door, before he finally 
mistakenly passed through the wrong one. The facts, 
as stated in the opinion of the Court, are as follows: 
"The jury could find that the plaintiff with 
two companions, returned to the garage about 2 
o'clock in the morning, February 11, 1933, and 
that, as they came along the middle of Waldo 
Street, there were no lights upon this private way 
or upon the outside of the garage. They tried to 
open the center door but \Vere unable to do so. 
They then inspected this door to determine if it 
contained a smaller door through which a person 
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might pass. They did not find any such door. 
They looked through the glass in the center door 
and saw a dim light inside the garage. They rap-
ped upon the door but none of the defendant's 
employees heard them, although one was busy in 
the stock room, a short distance away, checking 
figures. They then looked to see if there was an-
other entrance to the garage. One of the plain-
tiff's friends walked to the right and opened the 
easterly door, and the plaintiff believing that 
he was then using the westerly door, stepped in-
side and almost immediately fell down the iron 
stairway.'' 
The court in that case recognized the principle upon 
which defendant relies here: 
"If the plaintiff was injured "\\rhile upon a 
portion of the premises to which he was not in-
duced to go by the defendant in the transaction 
of the business between them, then, \vhile there, 
he could not demand the exercise of reasonable 
care toward him by the one in control and nlan-
agement of the locus." 
The facts in the case at bar do not involve such a situa-
tion since there is no evidence that the door \Yhich plain-
tiff was seeking \vas in any \Yay similar to the door 
through which he passed. l\Ioreover, the door which 
plaintiff was seeking \\·as in the opposite end of defend-
ant's premises at a place where it could not be readily 
mistaken for the door through \vhich plaintiff entered. 
Nor did plaintiff 1nake any reasonable effort to locate 
the right door before passing through the \Yrong one. 
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In the case of ill ont._qomery v. Allis-Chalmers ltfanu-
facturinlJ Co., (Tex.), 16± SW2d 556, the door through 
"\Vhich plaintiff passed opened immediately from the dis-
play room onto a stair,vay. Thus, there was no oppor-
tunity for plaintiff to change her mind and correct her 
1nistake after discovering her error. The basis for the 
Court's decision is found in the following language: 
"The doctrine we think applicable to the 
situation presented, is announced in 38 Am. Jur. 
(subject, N egl.), P'· 796, Sec. 135, as follows: 
'It is well settled that where a store, office 
building, or similar business establishment to 
which the public is in1pliedly invited has a door 
leading to a cellar, elevator shaft, or other dan-
gerous place, which is left unfastened, and which, 
from its location and appearance, may be mis-
taken for a door which a member of the public on 
the premises is entitled to use, the proprietor is 
liable to a person, who, by mistake, passes through 
that door and is injured.''' 
However, in the case at bar, the stairway down which 
plaintiff fell was not immediately adjacent to the swing-
ing door. On the contrary, he had to grope his way 
through the darkness for a considerable distance before 
he came to the stairway. When he opened the swinging 
door and entered the dark room, that should have been 
sufficient notice to him that he was on the wrong track. 
However, he persisted, even after he should have dis-
covered his error in following a pathway along which 
there was not the slightest indication of an invitation 
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to travel. The latter portion of the Am. Jur. statement 
quoted in the Montgomery case applies here: 
"* * * However, a recovery is denied the in-
jured person if the situation 'vas such as to af-
ford no reasonable ground for such a Inistake. 
~Ioreover,a person who has received an injury 
in consequence of passing through a wrong door-
way in a part of the building not designed for the 
use of unattended customers cannot recover un-
less he was induced to enter therein by the in-
vitation or allurement of the keeper of the prem-
ises." 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF ASSUMED THE RISK AS A MAITTER OF 
LAW. 
We here answer plaintiff's Point II. 
A case quite similar on its facts to the case at bar is 
Heidenreich v. Dumas, (N.H.), 190 A. 705. In that case 
the plaintiff, a customer in defendant's restaurant \vhere 
food and drink were dispensed, passed through a swing-
ing door in the rear \vhich gave access to a kitchen. Fron1 
the kitchen the only other door opened upon a flight of 
stairs descending to the cellar. Plaintiff, desiring to go 
to the toilet and assu1ning that it \Yas reached through the 
kitchen, passed through the kitchen in search of it. Al-
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though there was at least one employee working in the 
kitchen, plaintiff n1ade no inquiry for directions. He 
went to a door which was unmarked, but which he as-
sumed led to the toilet. Upon opening the door he found 
darkness on the other side. Still without making inquir-
ies as to a light or anything else, he stepped over the 
threshold and fell down the stairs into the cellar. On 
these ~~~ts the court held the plaintiff's motion for non-
suit should be granted and ordered judgment for the 
defendant. 
In the case of Thompson v. Beard and GablemanJ 
Inc.J (Kan.), 216 Pac. 2d, 798, the court said: 
"Suffice it to say that plaintiff was traveling 
in a course she did not know; the door leading 
from the private office was partially closed and 
the light dim; on pushing the door inward she was 
standing at the entrance of a basement stairway, 
no bar or barrier about the steps, and was con-
fronted with darkness which is always a signal 
of danger. The darkness or dimness of light called 
upon her to exercise greater caution for her own 
safety than is ordinarily required and it was her 
duty under such circumstances to refrain from 
proceeding further wiJthout finding out where she 
mi·ght safely goJ and by this failure to exercise 
ordinary care for her safety, she was guilty of 
neligence as a matter of law.JJ (Emphasis ours.) 
Another similar case is Illinois Central Railway 
Company v. S·andersonJ (Ky.), 192 S.W. 869. The court 
there said: 
"Passing the question whether the company 
which had provided a suitable toilet for men and 
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indicated its location by a proper sign, was bound 
to anticipate that the entrance to the basement 
might be mistaken by passengers as the entrance 
to the toilet ... and whether the entrance in ques-
tion was reasonably safe, it remains to determine 
whether plaintiff exercised ordinary care for his 
own safety. The mere fact that the door was there 
and partly opened was not sufficient to justify 
plaint~ff in assuming that the door led to the 
toilet. In view of the necessity for doors for other 
purposes, plaintiff should have anticipated that 
the door in question might lead to a place other 
than the toilet room. Plaintiff admits that he 
did not look where he was going. He further says 
that after he got through the door it was so dark 
he could not see. Notwithstanding the fact, he 
hurried through the door ... and fell down the 
stairs. To bolt headlong i'nto a place that is un-
known and so dark that one cannot see withottt_ 
stopping to determine U'hether it is safe to pro-
ceed is an act of recklessness about which reason-
able minds could not well differ . ... The trial 
court should h.ave held as a matter of law, that 
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, 
and have directed a verdict in favor of defend-
ant.'' (Emphasis ours.) 
In Sartori v. Capitol City Lodge, (~finn.) ± N.\:v. 
2d 339, the court held that a cornplaint 'vhich alleged that 
plaintiff, while seeking a toilet in defendant's building, 
entered a dark, unfamiliar passage,vay and fro1n it step-
ped into an open, totally dark basement doorw·ay thinking 
it to be the toilet entrance and "Tas injured, showed af-
firmatively that the plaintiff \Yas guilty of contributory 
negligence. 
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In a recent California case, Wolfe v. Green Mears 
Construction Company, 286 Pac. 2d 433, in holding plain-
tiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, 
the court gave weight to the fact that plaintiff failed to 
light matches which he had with him, while he was in 
such darkness that he could not see his way. The court 
quoted with approval from Robinson v. King, 113 ·Cal. 
App. 2d 455, 457, 248 P. 2d 477, as follows: 
"Where an invitee on premises, being un-
familiar therewith, proceeds into a place of in-
penetrable darkness and falls into an aperture and 
is injured, as a matter of law he does not exercise 
ordinary care for his own safety and hence any 
injury he receives is the result of his own con-
tributory negligence for which he may not re-
cover." 
The court also quoted with approval from Mitchell v. 
A. J. Bayer, Co., 126 Cal. App. 2d 501, 504, 272 P. 2d 
870, 872, as follows : 
"We are also of the opinion that plaintiff was 
shown to have been guilty of negligence as a 
matter of law. He stepped into an area with which 
he was unfamiliar; it was 'pitch dark' and he took 
no precautions for his safety." 
Another similar case where plaintiff was held guilty 
of contributory negligence as a matter of law, is Wil-
liams v. Treadway, (N.J.), 55 A. 2d 48. 
We have found no Utah cases as closely similar on 
their facts as those above cited and discussed. However, 
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three recent decisions of this court are in full accord with 
the principles upon which the foregoing decisions were 
reached. In Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, (Utah), 259 
P. 2d 297, this court held that the guest of a motel was 
guilty of contributory negligence when he collided with a 
chair while attempting to walk across his darkened room. 
Said the Court : 
"Dr. Morris appears to be confronted with 
two horns of a dilemma, either (a) the room was 
sufficiently lighted so that he could and should 
by the exercise of ordinary, reasonable care and 
observation for his own safety see the chair and 
avoid walking into it, or (b) the room, or the 
portion thereof in question, was so dark that he 
could not see an object such as a chair, in \Yhich 
event due care would have required him to turn on 
a light." 
In Tempest v. Richardson, (Utah), 299 P.2d 124, 
plaintiff was a guest in defendant's home. While seeking 
the bathroom, she opened a door and stepped inside and 
fell down a stairway. In holding her guilty of contribu-
tory negligence as a matter of la\v, this court said: 
"Had appellant exercised ordinary and rea-
sonable care for her o\vn safety she \vould not 
have opened a door and stepped into a dark and 
unlighted area \vith \Yhich she \Yas unacquainted, 
without first ascertaining \vhat \Vas beyond the 
door even though she had not been told that the 
roo1n to \vhich she was going was lighted." 
The doctrine of that case \vas follo,ved in the later 
case of Wood v. Wood, (Utah), 333 P.2d 630, \vhere this 
court said: 
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"In that regard she (plaintiff) is confronted 
\\rith a dilennna; she either had in mind the exist-
ence of the stairwell, or she did not. If she did, 
she was obligated to guard against the known 
hazard; if she did not, she is met with the princi-
ple recently affirrned by this court in the case of 
Tempest v. Richardson: that such a guest could 
not enter heedlessly into the darkness in an un-
known area and then compla~n of dangers there 
encountered." (Emphasis ours.) 
·Cases following the same line of reasoning are le-
gion. The following are illustrative, but by no means 
exhaustive, of the authorities: 
I-Iudson v. Church of the Holy Trinity, (N.Y.), 
166 NE 306; 
Smith v. S~mon's Supply Co., (~iass.) 76 NE 2d 
10; 
Plahn v. Masonic Ilall Building Assn., (Minn.), 
288 NW 575 
Pease v. Nichols, (Ky.), 316 SW 2d 849; 
Hart v. Sullivan., (Ill.), 58 NE 2d 301; 
Solomon v. Fi·ner, (N.J.), 180 Atl. 567; 
W esbrock v. Colby, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 494, 43 NE 
2d 405; 
Washburn v. Brunswick Hotel, 366 Pa. 463, 77 Atl. 
2d 357; 
Rhodes v. J. R. Watkins & Co., 16 Tenn. App. 163, 
65 s.w. 2d 1098. 
Knapp v. Conn. Theatrical Corp., 122 Conn. 413, 
190 Atl. 291. 
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The Utah case of JJ!f oore v. JJfiles, 158 P. 2d 676, i8 
cited and relied upon by plaintiff. We believe that that 
case is distinguishable from the case at bar, and from the 
other Utah cases cited by us. In that case, plaintiff was 
proceeding by a stairway which had been specifically pro-
vided by the defendant for the use of guests. There were 
no bars or obstructions to indicate that passage was for-
bidden, nor were there any warning signs. Plaintiff was 
following a path which she was invited to follow at the 
time of the accident. We believe that the basis of the 
court's decision is neatly summed up in the concurring 
opinion of Justice Wolfe, which reads as follows: 
"I concur. The stairway leading directly to 
the parking lot was not barred. It was app.arently 
for the use of the guests to make exit and entry to 
and from the parking lot. It constituted an invita-
tion to use it as such because it 'vas built for that 
purpose and left open for use. Whether under its 
improper state of lighting a prudent person 
should have accepted the implied invitation is a 
question for the jury 'vhose duty it is to judge 
'vhether the plaintiff trying to go to the parking 
lot in the most direct 'vay acted 'vith reasonable 
prudence under the circumstances of the case." 
(Emphasis ours.) 
To the extent that More v. llf£les is not distinguish-
able from Morri·s v. Farnsworth llfotel, (lTtah), 259 P. 
2d 297; Te1npest v. Ri.chardson, (lTtah), 299 P.2d 124, 
and Wood v. Wood, (Utah), 333 P.2d 630, it has, by 
necessary implication, been overruled by those later de-
cisions. 
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The case of JJfartin v. Fox West Coast Theatres 
Corp., (Cal. App.), 108 P.2d 29, is also distinguishable. 
As in llf oore v. Miles, the plaintiff was on a parking lot 
where he had a right to be and had been invited to come. 
He "ras entitled to expect that his host would have made 
the way safe or provided warning of any danger to be 
apprehended. Likewise, in the case of Flanigan v. Madi-
son Plaza Grill, Inc., (N. ,J.), 30 A.2d 38, the plaintiff was 
following a corridor which a sign indicated was the way 
to the restroom. She entered a doorway adjacent to a 
door indentified as leading to the men's restroom. Cer-
tainly this was a place where a ladies' rest room might be 
expected to be located. As observed by the Court: 
"The plaintiff's mistake was quite uderstand-
able considering the physical lay-out of the prem-
ises.'' 
So also, in Hall v. Boise Payette Lumber, (Ida.), 
125 P. 2d 311, the plaintiff was following a course which 
she had been directed to follow by the store manager. 
Again she was entitled to expect that the place would be 
made safe for her. There also the designated stairway 
was immediately adjacent to the hallway which she had 
been directed to enter. She did not proceed blindly 
through a considerable area before she encountered 
trouble. 
The case of Stickle v. Unvon Pacific Ravlroad Co., 
(Utah), 251 P.2d 867, is wholly different on its facts. 
We have no quarrel with the language of the court used 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
In that case, and quoted by plaintiff, but it is wholly 
inapplicable here. This is a case which is clear, and 
where the question of contributory negligence is free 
from doubt under principles repeatedly enunciated by 
this court, and which, therefore, meets the test laid down 
in the Stickle case, as one where the question of contribu-
tory negligence can be determined as a matter of law. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS NO DISPUTE IN THE ULTIMATE FA·CTS, 
AND THERE ARE NO CONTESTED ISSUES OF FACT TO 
BE DETERMINED BY A JURY. THEREFORE THIS IS A 
PROPER CASE FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
We recognize that summary judgment is a drastic 
remedy and one that should be granted only upon clear 
showing that there are no contested issues as to any ma-
terial facts. However, such a showing has been made 
here. Plaintiff's own testimony establishes his own want 
of care for his own safety. Under such circumstances, 
there would be no benefit to the plaintiff to have a jury 
trial which could only result in a directed verdict against 
him, upon the basis of his own adn1issions as to his own 
want of care for his own safety. 'Vhile a summary judg-
ment is a drastic remedy, it is one 'vhich the court should 
not hesitate to employ 'vhere 'varranted by the facts. 
Certainly it was provided in our rules of procedure for 
a definite purpose, na1nely to conserve the tin1e and ener-
gies of both the courts and the litigants in cases where 
there is no genuine issue of fact, and 'vhich can be re-
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solved as a 1natter of law. The basis and reasons for 
the rule are well stated 1n G Moore's Fed. Prac. Sec. 
56.04, p. 2028, as follows : 
"The summary judgment procedure pre-
scribed in Rule 56 is a p-rocedural device for 
pro1nptly disposing of actions in which there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact. In many 
cases there is no genuine issue of fact, although 
such an issue is raised by the formal pleadings. 
The purpose of Rule 56 is to eliminate a trial in 
such cases, since a trial is unnecessary and results 
in delay and expense which may operate to defeat 
in whole or in part the recovery of a just claim 
or the expeditious termination of an action be-
cause of a meritorious defense that is factually 
indisputable. 'The very object of a motion for 
summary judgment is to separate what is formal 
or pretended in denial or averment from what is 
genuine and substantial, so that only the latter 
may subject a suitor to the burden of a trial.' 
"To attain this end, the rule permits a party 
to pierce the allegations of fact in the pleadings 
and to obtain relief by summary judgment where 
facts set forth in detail in affidavits, deposition, 
and admissions on file show there are no genuine 
issues of material fact to be tried. 
"* * * The court is authorized to examine 
proffered materials extraneous to the pleadings, 
not for the purpose of trying an issue, but to de-
termine whether there is a genuine issue of ma-
terial fact to be tried. If there is no such genuine 
issue, the parties are not entitled to a trial, and 
the court, applying the law to the undisputed ma-
terial facts, may render a summary judgment.'' 
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CONCLUSION 
The testimonies on depositions of the parties and 
witnesses to the accident, show without dispute that 
plaintiff entered upon a portion of defendant's premises 
where he was not invited either expressly or by impli-
cation. Defendant therefore had no duty to anticipate 
his presence or to make the way safe for him, and there-
fore was not guilty of any negligence if plaintiff en-
countered a dangerous condition in passing through por-
tions of the premises to which he was not invited. There 
is no showing that defendant had any reason to anticipate 
the presence of patrons at the place where plaintiff was 
injured. Plaintiff's own testimony shows that he groped 
through -a darkened room where there was no illumina-
tion, and without availing himself of the means of light 
which he had at his disposal. In so doing, he encountered 
and failed to avoid a hazard which he could have readily 
discovered if he had simply lighted his cigarette lighter. 
Under the well established law as laid down by the de-
cisions of this court, he is guilty of contributory negli-
gence, and he voluntarily assumed the risk. He has no 
cause of action against -the defendant and the judgment 
below should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1\IORETON, CHRISTENSEN & 
CHRISTENSEN 
By: RAY R. ·CHRISTENSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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